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As the number of computers and computer systems in existence has grown over
the past few decades, we have come to depend on them to maintain the security of private
or sensitive information. The execution of a program may cause leaks of private or
sensitive information from the computer. Static secure flow analysis is an attempt to
detect these leaks prior to program execution.
It is possible to analyze programs by hand, but this is often impractical for large
programs. A better approach is to automate the analysis; which is what this thesis
explores.
We describe some previous research and give background information about
secure flow analysis. A secure flow analyzer is presented. It implements a secure flow
type inference algorithm, for a subset of Java 1 .0.2, using a parser generator called Java
Compiler Compiler (JavaCC). Semantic actions are inserted into a grammar specification
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The number of computers and computer networks has exploded over the past few
decades, and computer security is a major concern. In a multi-level system where
information exists with different security classifications, such as a military computer
system, we want to protect information with a high security classification. It is desirable
to have an automated tool to detect whether information we wish to keep secret in
applications remains secret and is not leaked. This thesis introduces a program that will
statically analyze a subset of Java programs to ensure that private information is not
leaked.
A. SECURE INFORMATION FLOW
Verifying secure information flow within computer systems is necessary in order
to protect sensitive information, especially in a military system. Denning and Denning
state that information flow occurs from a storage object x to another storage object y
when information stored in x is transferred to y, or used to derive information transferred
to y. A flow may be either explicit or implicit [1].
Explicit information flow occurs when information is directly copied or
transferred from one storage object to another. Consider the code segment "y := x". The
information contained in x is directly copied into y, so information flows from x to y.
The flow from x to y is independent of the value stored in x.
Implicit flow occurs when information is indirectly copied or transferred from one
storage object to another. If the variable x contains either or 1, then the following code
segment will copy the value of x into y using an implicit flow:
y:=0; if (x = 1) then y := 1
In this case, there is no direct flow from x to y. However, the value of x determines
whether the then statement will be executed. The flow in both of these examples is
allowed only if the security classification of y is at least that of x. For instance, if x were
classified high then y must also be classified high in order for the code to be secure [1].
B. A TYPE-BASED TREATMENT OF SECURE INFORMATION FLOW
Goguen and Meseguer introduced a notion of security for deterministic computer
systems called noninterference [2], The basic idea is that a system has users who may
supply information with various security classifications to the system. A system satisfies
the noninterference property if its low-level outputs remain the same when its high-level
inputs are changed.
Volpano and Smith [3] have applied this idea to programming languages. When
applied to languages, the idea is that low-level program outputs are unaffected by
changes in high-level program inputs.
C. A TYPE INFERENCE ALGORITHM
Volpano and Smith go on to describe an algorithm that is defined by cases on the
phrases of a simple imperative language. The evaluation ofan expression returns a
principal type and a set of typing constraints. A typing constraint is an inequality
between two types that are security levels. For example, if x is type high and t' is type
low then x' < x is a constraint. Note that x' = x is equivalent to x' < x and x < x'. It is
important to note also that the algorithm produces constraints among type variables,
where a type variable ranges over types like high and low. Constraint-set satisfiability
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can be used on the set of constraints to determine whether illegal flows exist in the
program being analyzed, for instance, if a constraint set contains high < low.
The classifications, or types, over which type variables range, depend on the
system being modeled. In a typical military system, the types would be unclassified,
confidential, secret, and top secret. For the purposes of this discussion, we consider a
simple system of only two types, high and low, where low < high.
As an example of how the algorithm works, consider the case of the preceding
assignment statement, y := x. Assuming x and y have already been assigned the type
variables To and Tj respectively, the following set of constraints will be generated by the
type inference algorithm:
{To<T2 , Tl = T2, T3 <T2 }
Therefore, the principal type of the expression is 13 cmd. The constraint set can be
simplified to {to < ti, 13 < Ti }. So, for the assignment statement y := x, the algorithm
states that the classification of y must be at least as high as the classification of x. The
second constraint allows downward coercion on command types [7].
D. AN IMPLEMENTION OF THE ALGORITHM
This thesis presents a Java program that implements the type inference algorithm.
The program is generated from a specification that is input to a compiler compiler called
JavaCC. JavaCC is a tool that reads a grammar specification written in a LEX/ YACC-
like manner and converts it into a parser for the grammar. The algorithm was
incorporated into a grammar specification for Java 1.0.2 supplied with the JavaCC
distribution. The actions specified by the algorithm were performed by adding Java code
3
(semantic actions) to the corresponding productions in the grammar specification. The
generated parser is a secure flow analyzer for a subset of Java. Several statements,
expressions, and other Java functionality were removed from the grammar specification
because they are not currently supported by the type inference algorithm
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Work in the area of secure information flow and a lattice model of secure
information flow are discussed in Chapter II, followed by a description of the secure flow
type system in Chapter III. The type-inference algorithm is discussed in Chapter IV. In
Chapter V, the static analyzer and the Java subset we consider are discussed. Chapter VI
gives an example run of the analyzer, and Chapter VII discusses some possible future
work and presents conclusions about secure flow analysis and the static analyzer.
II. THE LATTICE MODEL OF SECURE INFORMATION FLOW
The security mechanisms of most computer systems do not attempt to detect or
prevent insecure information flows. Computer system security requires that programs at
high security levels be unable to transfer information to low security users or programs.
Most access control mechanisms are concerned with direct access control and are not
concerned with information flow channels that may exist. Other systems rely on the
trustworthiness of processes [5].
In the lattice model of secure flow, a flow policy is represented by the poset
<S, ->> [5]. S is a set of security classes and -^ is a partial order, called the flow
relation. The flow relation specifies permissible flows between the security classes.
Every variable x is assigned a security class, denoted x, that is statically bound to x and
that can be determined at compile time from declarations given in the program. If x and
y are variables in a program and an information flow from x to y exists, then the flow is
allowed if x -> y [6].
Each programming construct has a certification rule. Some rules, such as
assignment statements, certify explicit flows and other rules, such as if statements, certify
implicit flows. An assignment statement, x := y, will be certified if x -> y. The rules for
conditional constructs such as the following if statement certify implicit flows.
if x = then y := eke z := 1
This statement is certified if x -^ y and x -> z.
If the poset <S, ~^> is a lattice, then there is a unique least upper bound and
greatest lower bound for any pair of classes. A simple grammar consisting of synthesized
attributes can be given to certify programs. The attributes are security classes computed
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using the least upper bound, lub, and greatest lower bound, gib, operations. For example,
the certification requirement for the above if statement becomes the single condition
x-»glbfcz)[6].
III. A SECURE FLOW TYPE SYSTEM
Volpano, Irvine, and Smith describe a type system consisting of a set of type
inference rules and axioms for deriving typing judgements. The types of the system are
divided into three levels. One level contains data types, which we refer to as z types.
These are the security classes of Denning's model and they are partially ordered, for
example, low < high.
At the next level, are the n types. They consist of the data types t, command
types z cmd and the procedure types
z proc{z\, i2 var, T3 ace)
A variable of type z var means it can store information at level z. A command has type
z cmd only if every assignment in the command is made to a variable whose security
level is z or higher. Lastly, the z in the above procedure type refers to the security level
of its body. That is, a call to a procedure of this type would have type z cmd.
At the third and final level are the p, or phrase, types. They consist of are the
n types, type t var and type z ace (we ignore type z ace). So, our procedure types, in this
this, are of the form:
zproc(z\ var,...,zn var)
The partial order on z types is extended to a subtype relation over phrase types.
The subtype relation is anti-monotonic in the types of the commands, meaning if z is a
subtype of z', then t' cmd is a subtype of z cmd. The intuition here is that if one can read
level z' (high) information then they can read level z (low) information. There is also a
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typical type subsumption rule that states if a phrase has type p then it can be assigned a
type p' if p is a subtype of p' [7].
The typing rules of the system guarantee secure explicit and implicit flow.
Consider the typing rule for assignment:
7 1- x : t var
y\- e : z
y\- x :=e : zcmd
where y is an identifier typing that maps identifiers to p types. The rule states that the
explicit flow from expression e to variable x is secure if e and x have the same security
level. This does not prevent e from having a lower security level than x, because
subtyping allows the level to be coerced upward.
The next example shows a rule that deals with a situation where an implicit flow
exists. Consider the following program phrase where x is either or 1
:
if x = 1 then y := 1 else y :=
There is no explicit flow from x to y, but when the phrase is executed, y will contain the
value of x. To guarantee the implicit flow from x to y is secure, the following typing rule
is used:
y |- e : t
y |- c : z cmd
y\- c' : zcmd
y\-ife then c else c' : zcmd
The commands c and c' must have type r cmd, because information of type r is implicitly
known by evaluating the predicate e. Therefore c and c' can only make assignments to
variables at security level t or higher. The rule requires e, c, and c' to have the same
security level, namely t. Nevertheless, an upward implicit flow from e to c and c' can be
accommodated by subtyping.
There is also a rule for local variable declarations. A local variable declaration of
the form
letvar x := e in c
creates a variable x with an initial value e, whose scope is command c. The initialization
of x may cause an implicit flow, but it is always harmless.
Two lemmas are needed to prove type soundness: Simple Security and
Confinement. Simple Security applies to expressions and Confinement applies to
commands. If an expression e can be assigned type r, then Simple Security states that
only variables of type x or lower will be read when e is evaluated (no read up).
Confinement says that if a command c can be assigned type z cmd, then every variable
that is updated in c has security level t or higher (no write down). These two lemmas are
used to prove that the type system is sound. Soundness is formulated as a
noninterference property. The noninterference property states that variables in a well-
typed program do not interfere with variables at lower security levels.
It is possible to automatically check whether a program is well typed, using the
techniques of type inference. The basic idea of type inference is to use type variables to
represent unknown types in a program, and to generate constraints in the form of
inequalities. An assignment of types to these variables must satisfy the constraints in
order for the program to be well typed with respect to that assignment. A principal type
can be formulated that represents all possible types the program can be given.
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IV. A SECURE FLOW TYPE INFERENCE ALGORITHM
A type inference algorithm that ensures secure information flow is described in
this chapter. Volpano and Smith have extended the type system discussed in the previous
chapter to a simple language with first order procedures [3]. They also prove the
noninterference property for the system in order to establish the type soundness in the






e t + e2 |
proc(in xj, inout x2 , out X3) c
commands ::= ci; c2 |
if e then cj else c2 \




letvar x := e in c
\
letproc x (in */, inout x2, out X3) c in c'
\
e(e],e2,e3 )
Figure 1 . Core Language
For expressions, meta-variable x ranges over identifiers, n ranges over integer literals,
and / ranges over locations. Expressions also consist ofanonymous procedure
expressions. Their names are provided via letproc.
Commands consist of the following: composition of commands, if, while loops,
assignment, variable declarations, procedure declarations, and procedure calls.
Volpano and Smith give a secure flow type inference algorithm in [3]. It is shown
in Figure 2 and is defined by cases on the phrases of the core language. The algorithm
takes as inputs a location typing A, an identifier typing 7, a program phrase p, and a set of
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rV(A,7,P,V) = ca»epof
i : case t(«) of
r({r<a),c,Vu{c,}) a^V
?oar: ({?<«}, a, Vu{«}) or g V
default : fail
»:«},o:,Vu{cf}) o * V
l:({A(0<a},a,VU{a}) <«^
ei + ej :
let(a, ) n,,V")=^(A,7,ea,n
in(CiUCaU{n=ft},T,,f")
proc (in xi, inout xa, oat u) c :
let (C.rcmd.V") - W^A.tIx, : a,x3 : P oar, x3 :* ace], c.VU {«,/?,*})
in (C,r proc(a, var, 6 ace), V") a, and * g V
ex; ca :fct (Ci,n cmd, V) = W{\,y,clt V)
kt (Ca.ft ctmf,r")= W(A,7,Ca, V)
in (Ci UCaU{f\ = ft},ft etnd y V")
if e then c\ else c3 :
let(C,T,V") = ^(A.9,e,V)
let (d , n cmd, V*) = W(X, 7, a , V)
kt (Ca.ft cmd, V") m W(A,7, ca, V*)
in (CUd Ud U{r = ft =ft,a< f^o cmd, V'w U{or}) or j?V"
while edoc:
fet(C,r l V') = ^(A,7,e,K)
let (C, f* cmd, V") - W(X, 7, c, K*)
in (CUC U \t = f, a <r), a cmd, V"U{a}) a g.V"




x : if t(x) = r oar or t(x) = f occ then
(C U {r = ?,«<?*}, a cmd, V'u{or}) o tf V
I: (CU {A(0 = ?*, o<r*}, or cmd, V^U {or}) a^V
default : fail
letvar i := t in c :
let(C,f
>n = ^(A.7,e,V0
kt (C,r cmd,V") m W{\,t[z :? oarlcV)
in (CuC.f cmd,V")
Ictproc x(in xi, Inout x3 , out xs) c in c' :
kt (C,w, V") = W(A,7,proe (in xi, Inout xa , ont x») c,V)
let (C,rcmd,Vn) = W{\,y,\proc (in x,, inout x3 , out xs ) c/xk', V)
infCuC.rcmd.K")
e(ei>«a,es}:
kt (C,t prcefn, ft oar, ft a«), V) = W(\,y,e,V)
kt(C,r',V) = rr'(A,7.ei.K')
kt C = ewe e3 of
x: if 7X*)*^'twtkenCuC"u{? = n,r"=:ra} eke fail
I: CuCu{f, = Tl ,X(l) = ri )
default r fail
in case « 3 of
x : if y(x) »**«« « 7(x) = r" ace then (Cu {?" - ft}, f cmd, V")
eke fail
I : (C" U (A(J) n ft},? cmd, V)
default :fail
Figure 2. Volpano-Smith Type Inference Algorithm
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type variables V. A location typing maps addresses to x types and an identifier typing
maps variables to types x and x var, for some x. The latter treats free variables in a
program, while the former treats free addresses. We shall assume programs have no free
addresses, and drop X from the implementation of the type inference algorithm. The set V
contains a list of previously-used type variables and allows the algorithm to choose new
type variables. If the algorithm succeeds, it returns a triple consisting of a set of
constraints C, a type n, and the updated set of stale variables V. The constraints in C are
inequalities among type variables.
To illustrate how the algorithm works, we give an example from [3], shown in
Figure 3, of a procedure that indirectly copies a variable x to another variable y.
proc (in x, out y)
letvar a := x in





Figure 3. Example Program
Figure 4 shows the results of calling the algorithm on the procedure. The algorithm yields
a triple consisting of a set of stale type variables V, the list of generated constraints and
the type ofthe procedure, here denoted by n . This triple is used to form the principal
type for the procedure.
Type simplification can be used to simplify the constraint set C and type n [8].
The static analyzer developed for this thesis does not include any mechanism to perform
type simplification and such simplification is shown here for demonstration purposes
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v = { a. y, v, o, e, i, £ v, 8, rj, 9, k, X, p, £}
c = {cc<y v = o, s=i, v<£,£=£y<£, i = v, 8 = rj, i <8,
rj = 0, 8< rj,y = k, u<y, k= A, y<K fi = <£ o<p, S< £}
7T = (v proc(or, Pace))
Figure 4. Algorithm Results of Sample Program
only. The first step collapses the strongly connected types and produces a more useful




{a, o, 8, £}
{8<$,o<X,X<8, a<X\
(o proc(a, 2, ace))
Figure 5. Algorithm Results after Type Simplification
Further simplification is possible leading to the % in Figure 6.
7t = (£proc(£ £ ace))
Figure 6. Principal Type after Applying Monotonicity-Based Instantiations
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TYPE INFERENCE ALGORITHM
The static analyzer that performs the security checks specified by the type
inference algorithm was developed using the Java Compiler Compiler (JavaCC). JavaCC
takes, as input, a grammar specification. The output is a Java program that will parse the
specified language and perform the semantic actions indicated in the grammar
specification.
Rather than start from scratch and build a JavaCC specification for the language
in Figure 1, we started with a grammar specification for Java 1.0.2, which we modified to
reflect the language in Figure 1 . Semantic actions were added to encode the type
inference algorithm. The specification is given in Appendix A. There are several
restrictions imposed on the kinds of Java programs that the static analyzer can check
because there are many constructs in the Java language that are not currently treated in
the type inference algorithm. Each of the phrases in Figure 1 was mapped to a
corresponding expression or statement in the Java grammar specification.
A. A BRIEF LOOK AT JAVACC
JavaCC constructs a Java program that acts as a recursive descent parser for the
language described by the grammar specification. A sample from the Java 1.0.2 grammar
specification is shown in Figure 7. The sample shows three productions that are used to
parse a Java method declaration and parameters. JavaCC converts each production into a
method in the generated parser.
15
voxd MethodDeclarator ( ) :
U
{
<IDENTIFIER> FormalParameters ( ) ( "[" "]" )*
}




[ FormalParameter () ( "," FormalParameter ( ) )* ] ")"
}






Figure 7. Sample Productions
Each production begins with the return type of the corresponding method in the
parser, which is void for the three productions in Figure 7. The name of the production
will also be the name of the method in the parser. Parameter passing can be adding to the
productions in the same way it is used in Java programs.
There is a notion of "calling" a production because of its relationship with the
corresponding method in the generated parser. For example, if the production
FormalParameter ( ) in Figure 7 is called, it will in turn call the productions
Type ( ) and VariableDeclaratorld ( ) .
Java code can be added anywhere in the production, but must be enclosed in curly
braces, "{ }". When JavaCC converts the production into its corresponding method, the
added code will remain where it was placed. Local variable declarations for any
production should be inserted in the first set of curly braces of that production. In the
three productions shown in Figure 7, there are no local variable declarations.
16
B. IMPLEMENTING THE ALGORITHM USING JAVACC
There are two main data structures in the implementation of the algorithm. The
first is called gamma, and contains identifier typings. The second is called triple, and
consists of the items returned by the type inference algorithm, namely, a set of constraints
C, a type n, and a list of stale type variables V.
The initial attempt to implement the algorithm used two Stacks from the Java
utility package. The gamma stack held objects called gamma items. A gamma item
consisted of a variable name and its type variable. The triple stack contained the triple
items consisting of the constraint set in the form of a linked list and the principal type.
The set of stale type variables was kept in a separate symbol generator for the entire
program.
The idea of the gamma stack was to push a gamma item whenever a new variable
was encountered and to pop the stack when the variable's scope ended. It became
apparent that determining when the variable's scope ended was going to be a difficult task
unless the analyzer kept track of more information about the variables being declared.
The analyzer soon had four separate stacks to keep track of the important information.
The triple stack had similar problems.
It was determined that all of the external stacks could be eliminated if the run time
stack was utilized. In this implementation, gamma became a linked list ofgamma items
that is passed as a parameter from one production to those productions it calls. In
addition, each production returns a triple that contains all the constraints generated in the
program. This did pose one problem. A local variable declaration requires an update to
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the gamma list with the variable's type information and it also requires the generation of a
new triple item. Both must be returned to the calling production.
This problem may be overcome by adding new productions to the specification
but the productions were not added in this implementation. Instead, a new data structure
was developed to simply hold the new gamma list and the generated triple so that both
the gamma list and the generated triple could be returned. The structure, called Dual, was
later updated to also hold a string when a similar situation arose in the method declaration
production that required a gamma list and the string representation of a token to be
returned.
Each of the commands and expressions of the core language listed in Figure 1 are
"mapped" to one or more productions in the Java 1.0.2 grammar specification. Mapping
the algorithm to the Java specification was performed in two steps. The first step was to
determine which productions in the grammar specification correspond to commands or
expressions in the core language. Once the relationship between the core language and
grammar specification was established, the second step entailed encoding the semantic
actions specified by the algorithm and placing the code in the corresponding productions
of the grammar specification. We consider, in turn, each of the cases of the algorithm in
Figure 2.
Case "x"
The Name ( ) production in the grammar file is an instance of case x. Name (
)
returns a string representation of the current token when the production is called. The
type inference algorithm requires the type of x, x or r var, to be determined. The type
18




The Literal ( ) production is an instance of case n. Literal () accepts the
Java primitive types of integers, floating point numbers, characters, strings, boolean
values "true" and "false", and "null".
Case "1"
The third case statement, /. deals with locations and is not implemented in the
Java grammar.
Case "ei + e2
"

















Case "proc(in xi, inout x2 , out x3 ) c"
The case in the algorithm for procedure declarations has the following form:
proc( in Xi, inout x2 , out X3) c
The modes of the parameters, in; inout; and out, are similar to those used in the Ada
programming language. The productions dealing with procedures starts with the
MethodDeclaration ( ) production. The name of the procedure and the parameters
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are treated in a call to the MethodDeclarator ( ) production. The parameters are
added to the environment with a call to the FormalParameters ( ) production so they
may be referenced in the body of the procedure. MethodDeclarator ( ) returns the
procedure name and the types of the parameters. All parameters are considered to be
inout mode and are typed as such, meaning they have type x var for some x. Finally the
body of the procedure, c, is handled in a call to the Block ( ) production. The static
analyzer does not handle recursive procedures or method declarations.
Case "ci; C2"
Next in the algorithm is the statement for composition, Ci; C2. Composition within
a block, delimited by { } , is handled by the BlockStatementList ( ) production.
The original Java grammar specification handled composition in the Block (
)
production. It was necessary to add the production BlockStatementList ( ) to
handle the letvar statement. Changes to the grammar specification for the letvar
statement are explained later in this section.
Case "if e then ci else C2"
If-then-else statements are handled by the IfStatement ( ) production in the
grammar specification. The else portion of the statement is not mandatory in Java. If it
is not used, then the semantic actions in the algorithm pertaining to the else statement are
not executed.
Case "while e do c"
The next case is the while loop of the form, while e do c. It has been mapped to
both the WhileStatement ( ) and DoStatement ( ) productions in the Java
specification.
20
Case "x := e"
The assignment statement x := e is mapped to Assignment ( ) . Note that " : ="
is not the only assignment operator allowed; others include: "*=", "/=", "+=", and "-=".
A modification to the grammar specification was required here. The Java 1.0.2 grammar
specification Assignment ( ) production is listed in Figure 8. The production,
PrimaryExpression ( ) , may be evaluated as a literal ( ) , Name ( )
,
Expression (), or AllocationExpression () . PrimaryExpression ( ) is
also called from a number of other productions as well and those productions require that
PrimaryExpression ( ) return a triple consisting of a constraint set, a type, and a list
of stale type variables. However, the Assignment ( ) production requires that
PrimaryExpression ( ) return the type of x from the identifier typing y. For this
reason, a new production, PrimaryLeftExpression ( ) , was introduced into the
Grammar specification. It returns the string representation of x, so that it may be
referenced in y, and replaces PrimaryExpression ( ) in the Assignment (
)
production.
void Assignment () :
{}
{
PrimaryExpression ( ) AssignmentOperator ( ) Expression
}
Figure 8. Assignment Production
2]
Case "letvar x := e in c"
Mapping the letvar statement to the Java language required another modification
to the Java grammar specification. The original specification handled local variable
declarations at the same level as all other statements within BlockStatement ( ) . The
original Java specification productions that handle local variable declarations are shown
in Figure 9.




( BlockStatement () )* "}"
void BlockStatement
LOOKAHEAD(Type() <IDENTIFIER>)





Type ( ) VariableDeclarator ( ) ( "," VariableDeclarator
}
Figure 9. Java Specification Productions to Handle Local Variable Declarations
In the original grammar specification, composition is handled in the Block (
)
production. The * operator indicates that the production(s) within the preceding set of
parentheses is called zero or more times. Two new productions,
BlockStatementList ( ) and LetvarStatement ( ) , were added to the grammar
specification because it is necessary to pass the identifier typing y, updated with a typing
for x, to the production that parses c in letvar x = e in c. The original Java 1 .0.2 grammar
specification had no productions specified for c, so BlockStatementList ( ) was
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introduced to handle this problem. In the modified grammar specification, Block (
)
calls BlockStatementList ( ) once per BlockStatement ( ) .
BlockStatementList ( ) , the production used to handle composition, calls
BlockStatement ( ) zero or more times. BlockStatement ( ) calls
LetvarStatement ( ) if a local variable declaration is found, otherwise.
Statement () is called. LetvarStatement ( ) first calls
LocalVariableDeclaration ( ) to handle the declaration, then
BlockStatementList ( ) to parse the rest of the program that is within the scope the
new variable. The section of the modified grammar file is listed in Figure 10.
Case "letproc x(in Xi, inout X2, out X3)c in c' "
The next case in the type inference algorithm, letproc, allows procedures to be
used polymorphically and was not implemented in the Java grammar specification.
Therefore, all procedures are treated as monomorphic in the analyzer specification.
Moreover, only static methods are allowed because that is the only kind of method the
algorithm treats.
Case "e(ei, e2, e3)"
The final case in the algorithm types procedure calls. The Java specification
handles procedure calls in the PrimaryPrefix ( ) production. First, the
name of the procedure is found in the identifier typing
, y, then the types of the arguments
are compared with those retrieved from y. The original grammar specification for Java
allowed arguments to be expressions. In the modified specification, all parameters must





L00KAHEAD(2) BlockStatement ( ) )+
void BlockStatement





void LetvarStatement ( ) :
LocalVariableDeclaration ( ) " ; " BlockStatementList
(
void LocalVariableDeclaration ( ) :
{}
{
Type() VariableDeclarator ( ) ( "," VariableDeclarator
1
Figure 10. Specification Changes for letvar Statement
All of the source code files used to implement the static analyzer are given in
Appendix B.
C. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON PROGRAMS
The type inference algorithm in [3] does not treat an object-oriented language like
Java. Although we started with a JavaCC specification for Java, the result was not an
analyzer for full Java but rather an analyzer for that subset of Java corresponding to the
simple language in Figure 1 . So how big is this subset?
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First, the subset that can be analyzed has no objects, and consequently no instance
variables or instance methods.
Second, all expressions must be free of any side effects. This is the reason that
assignment expressions in Java are prohibited, as are pre and post increment
"expressions". They all violate the confinement property.
Other restrictions on Java programs include that they be closed (no free
variables), that they have only non-recursive static methods, that they have no methods
with a return type other than void, and that they have no forward references. Yet, other
restrictions are imposed because certain constructs were not treated in the algorithm of
[3]. They include try-catch blocks, synchronized blocks and so on. In summary, the





3. Explicit Constructor Invocation
4. Conditional Expressions
5. Instanceof Expressions
6. Preincrement and PreDecrement Expressions
7. Postincrement and PostDecrement Expressions
8. Cast Expressions









1 6. Throw Statements





The constructs that have been disallowed have only been commented out in the
grammar specification file listed in Appendix A in order to allow for their
implementation in the future. This means they cannot be parsed in the current
implementation.
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VI. AN EXAMPLE RUN OF THE STATIC ANALYZER
The program in Figure 1 1 illustrates an application of the static analyzer. It
corresponds to the example program of Figure 3, in Chapter III, written in Java.
However, it is not identical, for Java has no parameter-passing mode corresponding to
mode out. Nevertheless, it serves to illustrate the analyzer. The results of the static
analyzer when run on this program are shown in Figure 12.
class test
{
public static void p(int x, int y)
{
int a = x;
int b = 0;
while (a > 0) {
b = b + 1;






Figure 1 1 . Static Analyzer Test Program
v = {to, Ti, 12, T3, t4, X5, X6, X7, X8, T9, X10, Tn, T12, T13, T14}
c = {Th = T12, Xl2<t4, X8 =U, X 5 = X4 , X2 < I4, Tn = Tg, 18 < ^6, T6 = T3, X7 = T6,
13 < T6 . Ill < X9,T9 = T2,Tl0 = X9, ^2 < T9 , Tl4 < Tl3, Tl = TB , T3 < Xl3, X < T2}
7t
= X12 proc(Tovar, Xivar)
Figure 12. Test Program Results
We sketch a trace of the analyzer on part of the program. The parameters, x and
y , are the first tokens to be analyzed. They are assigned the type variables xo and Xi
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respectively. Then the variable declaration:
int a = x
is analyzed. A new type variable for x, namely T2, is created and the constraint set
{to < T2} is generated. The constraint is generated by the case for identifiers where an
upward coercion is introduced (see Figure 2). The variable a is assigned the type
variable T2 in analyzing the rest of the program.
Next, the variable declaration:
int b -
is analyzed in the same manner, except that no constraint is generated since is an
integer. This is the integer literal case of the type inference algorithm. Finally, b is
assigned the type variable T3. At this point, gamma contains the following types:
{x : i ,y : Ti,a : i2 , b : t 3 }
and only one constraint, to < T2, exists.
Next, the while loop
while (a > 0)
is analyzed. The predicate, a > 0, is checked first and generates the following new
constraints:
T2 < T4, 14 = T5
The first comes from the identifier case of the algorithm (upward coercion of a's type)
and the second comes from x, = x 2 in the case for ei + ei in the algorithm of Figure 2,
where X, = x 4 and x 2 = x s The rest of the program is analyzed in the same manner.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
As we rely more on computer systems, secure flow analysis is a necessary tool to
protect the information stored on these systems. Denning's work [1] [5] provides a good
base of knowledge for secure information flow. The Lattice Model consists of a set of
storage objects, a set of processes, and a set of security classes. Each storage object is
bound statically or dynamically to a security class. Security classes are required to form
a lattice, hence the name. A flow relation indicates permitted information flows between
security classes. The lattice shows all allowed information flows within the system.
Volpano and Smith [3] treat the model in the context of a type system and prove
the soundness of the type system. They also give a type inference algorithm for the
system. This thesis describes an implementation of that algorithm using JavaCC. The
result is a static analyzer that checks for secure information flow at compile-time.
The static analyzer can only analyze a subset of the Java 1 .0.2 language. It may
be too limited to allow one to write interesting and useful programs. Future work might
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APPENDIX A - JAVA GRAMMAR SPECIFICATION
The following pages represent the modified Java 1.0.2 grammar specification that
is the input to the Java Compiler Compiler The original grammar file was developed by
Sriram Sankar on 6/1 1/96 and is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems Inc Semantic actions
were added to the original grammar to perform secure flow analysis on a subset of Java
1.0.2 programs
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* Copyright (C) 1996, 1997 Sun Microsystems Inc.*
*
* Use of this file and the system it is part of is constrained by the
* file COPYRIGHT in the root directory of this system. You may,
* however, make any modifications you wish to this file.
*
* Java files generated by running JavaCC on this file (or modified
* versions of this file) may be used in exactly the same manner as
* Java files generated from any grammar developed by you.
*
* Author: Sriram Sankar
* Date: 6/11/96
* This file contains a Java grammar and actions that implement a
* front-end.
*
* Modified 24 Feb 98 by LT James D. Harvey, USN.
*
* Modifications have been made to incorporate a type checker into the
* compiler. Several portions of the Java language have been disabled
* in this version because the type checker does not support them. The
* portions that are not implemented are as follows:
* Static Initializers
* Arrays
* Explicit Constructor Invocation
* Conditional Expressions
* Instanceof Expressions

























public class JavaParser {
static SymbolGeneratcr sg = new SymbolGenerator ( )
;
public static void main (String args[]) {
JavaParser parser;
Triple ConstraintSet;
Gamma gamma = new Gamma ( "myGamma" )
;
if (args. length == 0) {
System. out .println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: Reading from
standard input . . .");
parser = new JavaParser (System. in)
;
} else if (args. length == 1) {
System. out
.
println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: Reading from file
" + args[0] + " . . .")
;
try {
parser = new JavaParser (new Java . io . FileInputStream(args [ 0] ) ) ;
} catch ( Java . io . FileNotFoundException e) {
System. out .println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: File " +




System. out .println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: Usage is one
of:")
;
System. out .println (
"
Java JavaParser < inputfile" )
;
System. out .println ("OR")
;




ConstraintSet = parser . CompilationUnit (gamma)
;
System. out .println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: Java program
parsed successfully.");
] catch (ParseError e) {
System. out
.
println ( "Java Parser Version 1.0.2: Encountered

















SPECIAL_TOKEN : /* COMMENTS V
{
<SINGLE_LINE_COMMENT: "//" ( ~ [ "\n", "\r " ] ) * ( "\n" | "\r" | "\r\n")
>
I












TOKEN : /* RESERVED WORDS AND LITERALS */
{
< ABSTRACT: "abstract" >
< BOOLEAN: "boolean" >
< BREAK: "break" >
< BYTE: "byte" >
< CASE: "case" >
< CATCH: "catch" >
< CHAR: "char" >
< CLASS: "class" >
< CONST: "const" >
< CONTINUE: "continue" >
< _DEFAULT: "default" >
< DO: "do" >
< DOUBLE: "double" >
< EXTENDS: "extends" >
< FALSE: "false" >
< FINAL: "final" >
< FINALLY: "finally" >
< FLOAT: "float" >
< FOR: "for" >
< GOTO: "goto" >
< IF: "if" >
< IMPLEMENTS: "implements" >
< IMPORT: "import" >
< INSTANCEOF: "instanceof" >
< INT: "int" >
< INTERFACE: "interface" >
< LONG: "long" >
< NATIVE: "native" >
< NEW: "new" >
< NULL: "null" >
< PACKAGE: "package ">
< PRIVATE: "private" >
< PROTECTED: "protected" >
< PUBLIC: "public" >
< RETURN: "return" >
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< SHORT: "shore" >
< STATIC: "static" >
< SUPER: "super" >
< SWITCH: "switch" >
< SYNCHRONIZED: "synchronized" >
< THIS: "this" >
< THROW: "throw" >
< THROWS: "throws" >
< TRANSIENT: "transient" >
< TRUE: "true" >
< TRY: "try" >
< VOID: "void" >
< VOLATILE: "volatile" >
< WHILE: "while" >
TOKEN : /+ LITERALS */
{
< INTEGER_LITERAL:





sUtirtii ijiitiKAjj/ 1 [ -L , J_i j i :
>
i
< #DECIMAL LITERAL: [" i"-"9" ] (["0"-"9"])* >
I
< #HEX_LITERAL: "0" ["x","X"] ( [ "0"- "9" , "a"-"f " , "A"-"F" ] ) + >
I









" ] ) + "." ( ["0"-"9"] ) * (<EXPONENT>)
?
( ["f", "F", "d", "D"] )
?
I
"." (["0"-"9"])+ (<EXPONENT>) ? ( [ "f ", "F" , "d", "D" ] )
?
I (
["0"-"9"] )+ <EXPONENT> ( [ "f " , "F" , "d" , "D" ] )
?
| (










( (-[ ,"\\","\n","\r"] )
I
("\\"





























TOKEN : /* IDENTIFIERS */

























































< LPAREN " ( 1 >
"X.




< LBRACE ii r
t
' >




1 < RERACKET ']" >
V SEMICOLON: r
1 < COMMA: "," >
1 < DOT : " " >




















" + " >
11 + 11 V,
"/" >
BIT_AND: "&" >
BIT_OR: " | " >















ANDASSIGN: '*& = " >
ORASSIGN: "|=" >








* THE JAVA LANGUAGE GRAMMAR STARTS HERE *
•*•** + + + + + + + + * + + + + + + * + * + *•**• + + + + + '*•'*•******- + + +
/*
* Program structuring syntax follows.
*/
Triple CompilationUnit (Gamma gamma) :




// ( ImportDeclaration ( ) )*




void PackageDeclaration ( ) :
{ }
{
"package" Name ( ) ";
"
void ImportDeclaration ( ) :
{}
{
"import" Named [ "•" " + " ] ";"
}
Triple TypeDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
{Triple cs = null;}
{
(LOOKAHEAD( ( "abstract" I "final" I "public" )* "class"









{ return cs ;
}
/*
* Declaration syntax follows.
V
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Triple ClassDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
i
i
Triple cs = null;
Dual d = new Dual ( cs ,- gamma ) ;
}
{
( "abstract" | "final" | "public" )*
"class" <IDENTIFIER> [ "extends" Name ( ) ] [ "implements" NameList (
)
"{"
( d = ClassBodyDeclaration (d. gamma) ) * "}"
r
i
if (d != null)
{
I





Dual ClassBodyDeclaration (Gamma gamma
{
Triple cs = null;






LOOKAHEAD( [ "public" | "protected" | "private" ] Name ( ) "(" )
cs = ConstructorDeclaration (gamma)
{d = new Dual (cs, gamma) ;
}
I
LOOKAHEAD { MethodDeclarationLookahead ( ) )
d = MethodDeclaration (gamma
)
I




println ( "Constraint set: " + d.cs);
System. out
.




// This production is to determine lookahead only,
void MethodDeclarationLookahead ( ) :
{ )
{
( "public" | "protected" | "private" | "static" | "abstract"
I
"final" | "native" I "synchronized" )*
ResultType ( ) <IDENTIFIED "("
}
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void InterfaceDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
Triple cS = null;
}
( "abstract" | "public" )*
"interface" <IDENTIFIER> [ "extends" NameListO
"{"
( InterfaceMemberDeclaration (gamma ) ) + "}"
void InterfaceMemberDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
}
LOOKAHEAD( MethodDeclarationLookahead ( ) )
MethodDeclaration (gamma)
FieldDeclara tion (gamma)
Dual FieldDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
Dual d = null;














Dual VariableDeclarator (Gamma gamma) :
>





id = VariableDeclaratorld ( ) ( "=" cs = Variablelnitializer (gamma)
cs = Default ( ) )
{
gamma - gamma .Append (new Gammaltem(id, cs
.
getType ( ) , "var" ) ) ;





Triple Default ( ) :
{}
{
{return new Triple ( sg .NextSymbol () , "");)
}
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Triple Variablelnitializer (Gamma gamma) :




[ Variablelnitializer () ( L00KAHEAD(2) "," Variablelnitializer
(
)* ] [ "," ] ")"
I
*/





Dual MethodDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
t
Triple cs = null;
Dual d = new Dual ( cs, gamma )
;
Gamma temp;




( "public" | "protected" I "private" I "static" I "abstract" I
"final" | "native" | "synchronized" )*
ResultType (
temp = MethodDeclarator (gamma, d)
{
whi 1 e ( ! ( temp . i s Emp t y ( ) ) ) {
Gammaltem gi = (Gammaltem) temp
.
getFromList () ;
gamma = gamma .Append (gi )
;
param = param. Append (gi )
temp = temp. removeFromList ( ) ;
} //end while
}
[ "throws" NameListO ]
( cs = Block (gamma) I ";" )
{
Gammaltem GI = new Gammal tern (d. id, cs
.
getType ( ) , "proc");
GI . setParam (param)
;
d. gamma = d. gamma .Append (GI )
;








<IDENTIFIER> {id = token . image ;
}






Gamma FormalParameters ( ) :















Type ( ) id = VariableDeclaratorld (
)
{





Triple ConstructorDeclaration (Gamma gamma) :
{Triple cs = null;)
i
[ "public" | "protected"
I
"private" ]
<IDENTIFIER> gamma = FormalParameters ( ) [ "throws" NameListO ]
"{" //[ L00KAHEAD(2) ExplicitConstructorlnvocation ( ) ]







"this" Arguments () ";"
I




void Staticlnitializer ( ) :
{}
"static" Block ( )
)
* Type, name and expression syntax follows
* /
void Type ( ) :
( PrimitiveType ( ) I Name ( ) ) (»[»»]»)*













String Name ( ) :
/*
* A lookahead of 2 is required below since "Name" can be followed







{id = token . image ;
}














* Expression syntax follows.
*/
Triple Expression (Gamma gamma) :
(Triple cs;
{
( LOOKAHEAD ( PrimaryExpression ( gamma ) AssignmentOperator
cs = Assignment (gamma
)
I














Gammaltem item = gamma . FindType (id)
;
if (item != null)
{
String mod = item. getModifier ()
;
if (mod. equals ( "var" ) || mod . equals ( "ace" )) {
String tau = item. getType ()
;




String alpha = sg. Next Symbol ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( tau, tauPrime)
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tauPrime, tau)
Constraintltem ci3 = new Constraintltem (alpha, tauPrime )
;
cs = cs .Append ( cil
)
cs = cs .Append ( ci2
cs = cs .Append ( ci3





println ( "Secure Parse failed");





System. out .println ( "Unrecognized variable " + id);






it_.ii ti + _.»i " /=" "a



















Triple cs2 = null;}
i
csl = ConditionalAndExpression (gamma ) ( "| I" cs2 =
ConditionalAndExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
{




String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem (taul, tau2
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem( tau2, taul





{ return csl ;
}




Triple cs2 = null;
csl = InclusiveOrExpression (gamma) ( "&&" cs2 =
InclusiveOrExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
String taul = csl
.
getType ()
String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new ConstraintItem(taul , tau2
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem( tau2 , taul




{ return csl ;
}
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Triple InclusiveOrExpression (Gamma gamma'
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
csl = ExclusiveOrExpression (gamma ) ( "|" cs2 =
ExclusiveOrExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
{
String taul = csl
.
getType () ;




Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul, tau2
[
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tau2 , taul








Triple cs2 = null;
csl = AndExpression (gamma) ( """ cs2 = AndExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
String taul = csl
.
getType () ;
String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul , tau2 ) ;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tau2 , taul )
;
csl = csl .Union (cs2 ) .Append (cil ) .Append (ci2 )
return csl;
4 l)
Triple AndExpression (Gamma gamma
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
csl = EqualityExpression (gamma) ( "&" cs2 = EqualityExpression (gamma
]
{
if (cs2 != null)
{




String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraint-Item cil = new ConstraintItem( taul , tau2 )
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem( tau2 , taul )






Triple EqualityExpression (Gamma gamma
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
csl = RelationalExpression (gamma) ( ( "==" | "!=» ) CS 2 =
RelationalExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
String taul = csl
.
getType ()
String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new ConstraintItem( taul, tau2 )
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem(tau2, taul)










void InstanceOfExpression ( ) :
{}
{




Triple RelationalExpression (Gamma gamma)
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
csl = ShiftExpression (gamma) ( ( "<" | ">" | "<=" | ">=" ) cs2
ShiftExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null) {




String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul , tau2 )
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tau2 , taul )
csl = csl .Union (cs2 ) .Append (cil) .Append (ci2) ;
return csl;
!
Triple ShiftExpression ( Gamma gamma) :
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
}
{




if (cs2 != null)
{
String taul = csl
.
getType ()
String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem (taul , tau2 )
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem( tau2, taul)







Triple AdditiveExpression (Gamma gamma) :
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
)
{
csl - MultiplicativeExpression (gamma) ( ( "+" | "-" ) cs2 =
MultiplicativeExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
{




String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul , tau2 )
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem (tau2, taul )
csl = csl . Union (cs2 ) .Append (cil ) .Append ( ci2 )
;
return csl;
Triple MultiplicativeExpression (Gamma gamma
{
Triple csl;
Triple cs2 = null;
csl = UnaryExpression (gamma) ( ( " + " I "/" | "-" ) cs2 =
UnaryExpression (gamma)
{
if (cs2 != null)
{
String taul = csl
.
getType ()
String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul , tau2 )
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltemf tau2 , taul )























void PrelncrementExpression ( ) :
{ )
{
"++" PrimaryExpression ( )
}










(( "~" I "!" ) cs = UnaryExpression (gamma)
I
/*





cs = PostfixExpression (gamma) )




// This production is to determine lookahead only. The LOOKAHEAD
// specifications below are not used, but they are there just to
// indicate that we know about this,










it r T1 M 1 Tl
"(" Named ")" ( "~" I "<" I "(" I <IDENTIFIER> | "this" | "super"
new" | Literal () )
*/
Triple PostfixExpression (Gamma gamma) :
Triple cs ;
}




void CastExpression ( ) :
}
( LOOKAHEAD ( 2
)
"(" PrimitiveType () ( "[" "]" )* ")" UnaryExpression (
)
"(" Named ( "[" "]" )* ")" UnaryExpressionNotPlusMinus
*/
Triple PrimaryExpression (Gamma gamma) :
Triple cs = null;}




Triple PrimaryPref ix ( Gamma gamma) :
{
Triple cs = null;
Triple csl = null;
Triple cs2 = null;
String id = null;
Gamma temp = null;
]
{
( cs = Literal ( )
I
["this" "."] id = Named
{
Gammaltem item = gamma . FindType ( id)
;
if (item != null)
{
String mod = item. getModifier ( )
;
if (mod. equals ( "var" ) II mod. equals (""))
{
String tau = item. getType ( )
;
String alpha = sg . NextSymbol ( )
;
Constraintltem cxl = new ConstraintItem( tau, alpha )
;
cs = new Triple ( cil , alpha ,"")
}
else if (mod. equals ( "proc" ))
{







println ( "Secure Parse failed");








println ( "Undefined variable: " + id);
// System. exit ( 0)
;






[ csl = PrimaryPref ix (gamma)
{
//create constraint type (csl) = type (param)
String tauPrime = csl
.
getType ()
String taul = ( (Gammaltem) temp
.
getFromList ()). getType ()
;
temp . removeFromList ( )
;
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem (taul , tauPrime)
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem (tauPrime, taul )
//add constraint to csl





"," cs2 - PrimaryPref ix (gamma)
{
//create constraint type(cs2) - type (param)




String tau2 = ( (Gammaltem) temp
.
getFromList ()). getType ()
temp. removeFromList ( )
Constraintltem ci3 = new Constraintltem ( tau2 , tauDoublePrime)
;
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Constraintltem ci4 = new Constraintltem ( tauDoublePrime, tau2 )
;
//csl Union cs2
csl = csl .Union (cs2 )
;
//add constraint to csl
csl = csl .Append ( ci3) .Append (ci4 )
;



























Triple PrimarySuf f ix ( ) :
{}
{































NullLiteral ( ) )
{return new Triple ( sg . NextSymbol (),"" ) ;
}













void Arguments ( ) :
"("
[ ArgumentList ( ) ] ")"
}
Triple ArgumentList (Gamma gamma) :
{ }
{





"new" PrimitiveType ( ) ArrayDimensions (
)
I
"new" Name ( ) ( Arguments ( ) I ArrayDimensions ( ) )
}
V
/* The second LOOKAHEAD specification below is to parse to
* PrimarySuf fixif there is an expression between the "[...]". + /
/*
void ArrayDimensions ( ) :
{ }
!




+ Statement syntax follows.
*/
Triple Statement (Gamma gamma) :







cs - Block (gamma)
cs = EmptyStatement (gamma)









cs = WhileStatement (gamma)



















void LabeledStatement ( ) :
{ 1
{








"{" cs = BlockStatementList (gamma) "}"
{ return cs ;
]
Triple BlockStatementList (Gamma gamma)
{










if (cs2 != null) {








String tau2 = cs2
.
getType ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( taul, tau2)
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tau2 , taul )
csl = csl . Union (cs2 )
;
csl = csl .Append ( cil ) ;









( LOOKAHEAD (Type ( ) <IDENTIFIER>
)
cs = LetvarStatement (gamma
)
I





Triple LetvarStatement (Gamma gamma)
{
Dual d;
Triple cs = null;
}
{
d = LocalVariableDeclaration (gamma!




cs = BlockStatementList (gamma)
{
if (cs != null)
{
cs .Union (d. cs ) ;














d = VariableDeclarator (gamma)
(











{return new Triple (sg.NextSymbol (), "cmd" );
J
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Triple StatementExpression (Gamma gamma) :
/ +
+ The last expansion of this production accepts more than the legal
* Java expansions for StatementExpression.
V
{ Triple cs ;
)
{
( LOOKAHEAD ( PrimaryExpression ( gamma ) AssignmentOperator (gamma) )
cs = Assignment (gamma)
I
cs = PostfixExpression (gamma ) )




void SwitchStatement ( ) :
{)
{
"switch" "(" Expression () ")" "{"
( SwitchLabel ( ) ( BlockStatement ( ) ) + )*
"}"
}
void SwitchLabel ( ) :
{)
{






Triple IfStatement (Gamma gamma) :
/*
* The disambiguating algorithm of JavaCC automatically binds dangling
* else's to the innermost if statement. The LOOKAHEAD specification





Triple cs2 = null;
"if" "(" cs = Expression (gamma) ")"
csl = Statement (gamma)
[ LOOKAHEAD(l) "else" cs2 = Statement (gamma) ]
{








String alpha = sg . NextSymbol ( )
;
Constraintltem cil = new ConstraintI tern ( tau, taul )
;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem (taul, tau)
Constraintltem ci3 = new Constraintltemfalpha, tau)
;
cs = cs . Union (csl ) .Append (cil ) .Append ( ci2 ) .Append (ci3 )
;
cs . setType (alpha )
;
cs . setModifier ( "cmd" )
;
if (cs2 != null)
{




Constraintltem ci4 = new ConstraintItem( tau, tau2 )
;
Constraintltem ci5 = new ConstraintItem( tau2, tau)
Constraintltem ci6 = new ConstraintItem( taul, tau2 )
;
Constraintltem ci7 = new Constraintltem (tau2 , taul )
cs =





Triple WhileStatement (Gamma gamma)
{
Triple csl = null;
Triple cs2 = null;
"while" "(" csl - Expression (gamma ) ")" cs2 = Statement (gamma
]
{








String alpha = sg . NextSymbol ()
;
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem (tau, tauPrime ) ;
Constraintltem ci2 = new Constraintltem ( tauPrime, tau)
;
Constraintltem ci3 = new Constraintltem (alpha, tau)
;
csl = csl .Union (cs2 ) .Append ( cil ) .Append ( ci2 ) .Append (ci3)
;
csl . setType (alpha )
;
csl . setModifier ( "cmd" ) ;
return csl;
Triple DoStatement (Gamma gamma;
{
Triple csl = null;
Triple cs2 = null;
I
"do" cs2 = Statement (gamma) "while" "(" csl = Expression (gamma!
String tau = csl
.
getType ()
String tauPrime = cs2
.
getType ()
String alpha = sg. NextSymbol ()
Constraintltem cil = new Constraintltem ( tau, tauPrime)
Constraintltem ci2 = new ConstraintItem( tauPrime, tau)
Constraintltem ci3 = new Constraintltem (alpha, tau)
csl = csl .Union ( cs2 ) .Append (cil ) .Append (ci2 ) .Append (ci3)
csl . setType (alpha)





void ForStatement ( ) :
U
{





void Forlnit ( ) :





void StatementExpressionList ( ) :
StatementExpression ( ) ( "," StatementExpression
void ForUpdate ( ) :
StatementExpressionList (
void BreakStatement ( ) :
"break" [ <IDENTIFIED ]
void ContinueStatement ( ) :
"continue" [ <IDENTIFIER> ] ";"
void ReturnStatement ( ) :
}
"return" [ Expression ( ) ]
void ThrowStatement ( ) :
"throw" Expression ()
void SynchronizedStatement ( ) :







( "catch" "(" FormalParameter ( ) ")" Block () )
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// File: Gamma. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static





protected Object ob j ;
protected Gamma next;
protected Gamma rear = null;
public String name;
public Gamma (String name)
{
this.obj = null;
this. next = this;
this. name = name;







this. next = this;









public synchronized boolean isEmpty
{





public Gamma Append (Gamma Item gi
)
{






public Gammaltem FindType ( String name)
Gammaltem temp = null;
Gamma list = this;




String item = (( Gammaltem) list . obj ). Name;
if ( item. equals (name ) )
{





list = ( Gamma ) list . next ;
}//end if













/ /**±ir + ** + * + ** + ± + + + ic**ir + + + + * + + irieir + + ** + + + + + ± + + **+ + ic + + + + + + + + -)r-)r + -k + + -1rie-k-)c-k-ir +
// File: Gammal tern. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer. It is an item to be placed into gamma. The
// structure consists of a name and a type. The type may
// consist of 1-3 fields.
package thesis;
import java.io. + ;






public GammaItem(String Name, SymbolGenerator sg, String mod)
{
this. Name = Name;
this. Type = sg . NextSymbol ( )
;
this .Modifier = mod;
1
public Gammaltem( String Name, String Type, String mod)
{
this. Name = Name;
this. Type = Type;
this .Modi fier = mod;
public void set Param (Gamma gammal
this. param = gamma;
public Gamma getParamf)
{


















if (Modifier . equals ( "proc" ) ) {
return ("("+ Name +":"+ Type + Modifier +"("+ param +")"+")");
)
elsel





// + + * + + + + ** + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + + + + + * + * + * + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + *+ + + ++*
II File: Triple. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer. The structure consists of a constraint set
// and a principle type. The type may consist of 1-2
// fields.







private String TypeModif ier
;
public Triple ( )
(
this. Type = "Type";
this .TypeModif ier = "mod";
ConstraintSet = new LinkedList ( "name" )
;
public Triple (Constraintltem ci, String Type, String Modifier;
{
ConstraintSet = new LinkedList ( "name" )
this. Type = Type;
this . TypeModifier = Modifier;
ConstraintSet = ConstraintSet . addToList (ci )
;
public Triple (LinkedList ConstraintSet, String Type, String Modifier)
{
this. Type = Type;
this .TypeModif ier = Modifier;
this . ConstraintSet = ConstraintSet;
}
public Triple (String Type, String Modifier)
{
this. Type = Type;
this. TypeModifier = Modifier;
ConstraintSet = new LinkedList ( "name" )
]






public String getModif ier (
)
<
return this . TypeModifier
;
public void setModif ier (String Modifier)
{
this . TypeModifier - Modifier;
i
i
public void setType (String type)
{
this. Type = type;
)
public Triple Union (Triple setTwo)
{
LinkedList temp = this . ConstraintSet
;
if ( (Constraintltem) temp. obj == null){




while (temp . next . obj != null){
temp = temp. next;
temp. next = setTwo . ConstraintSet
;
this . ConstraintSet . rear = setTwo . ConstraintSet . rear
;
return new Triple (this. ConstraintSet, this. Type, this. TypeModifier )
;
public Triple Append (Constraintltem C)
!











// + + + + + + 4- + + ^4. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ^* + + + + + + *+ + + 4- + + + + + + + + + + 4- + + + + + * + 4-->- + -*- + *+ + *,l.*-l-*
// File: Constraintltem. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static







public ConstraintItem(String Typel, String Type2
)
!
this. Typel = Typel;
this.Type2 = Type2;
public String toString (
)
(







// Date: 24 Feb 96
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//





protected Object ob j ;
protected LinkedList next;
protected LinkedList rear - null;
public String name;




this. next = this;
this. name = name;






this. next = this;
public LinkedList addToList (Ob ject o]
{
LinkedList 1 = new LinkedList ( )
;
1 . ob j = o;
l.next = this;
return 1;
public Object getFromList (
)
return this.obj;




public synchronized boolean isEmptyO
{




public String toString (
)
{








// File: SyrnbolGenetator . Java
// Date: 24 Feb 9 8
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer. Generates new type variables
package thesis;






private int counter = 0;
private static String TAU = "tau";
public synchronized String NextSymbol (
)
f
String Symbol = TAU + counter;
counter++;
return Symbol;
public static void main (String [] args)
;
i
SymbolGenerator sg = new SymbolGenerator
for (int i = 0; i < 10; i++)
{







// + + ±* + + + + + ± + + ± + + + ± + ± + + + + ± + + + + * + ± + ±± + ±± + + + + ± + + + + + + + + + + + + ± + + + ± + + + -)r-k-)r->r + + +
II File: SyrobolGenetator . j ava
// Date: 2 4 Feb 9 8
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer. A data structure







public Dual (Triple cs, Gamma gamma)
{
4-v. .: _ ,-,_ .. _„ ,t-iiXo.wo — wo ,
this. gamma = gamma;
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APPENDIX C - TEST PROGRAMS
7')
// + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + *
// File: test. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer.
// + + + ± + + + + + + + + + + + + + + ±±±± + + + + + + + + ± + + + + + + + + + + ± + + + + + + + ± + ± + + + + + + + + -k-k-)r + -lr + +
class test
{
public static void pl(int x, int y)
{
y = x;
The output of the static analyzer on the above program produced the following results:
Constraint set: {13 < T2, T2 = Xi, to < 12}
Gamma: pi : x^proc (x var, Xivar)
Results show, with x: x ()var and y: iivar, that Xo < Xi. This is what we would expect to
ensure secure flow since the program assigns the value of x to y.
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// + + + + + + + + *- + * + + **- + ** + *7k- + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + + + + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
// File: test. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information flow static
// analyzer.
// + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + *- +
class test
{
public static void pl(int x, int y)
{




The output of the static analyzer on the above program produced the following results:
Constraint set: {17 = X5, 17 = i:, Xs < X2, X5 = X2, X3 = X2,
Xo < X2 , T5 < X4 , 14 = Xi, x 7 < x6 , X6 = Xi }
Gamma: pi . Xsproc (Xovar, iivar)
// + * + + + + + + ** + + + * + + + + + + * + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + *• + + + •*• + *-*- + *• + *•
// File: test. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information
// flow static analyzer.
//** + ** + + + + + + + * + + + * + + + + + + + + * + + + + + + + • + + + + + + + + + + *-* + + + + + *• + + *-*--*•
class test
{
public static void pl(int x, int y)
{
int a = x;
int b = 0;
while (a > 0)
{
b = b + 1;




The output of the static analyzer on the above program produced the following results:
Constraint set: {ii 4 = in, Xi2< U, is = U, x? = X4, X2 < U, in = is,
18 < T6, T6 = 13. 17 = 16. T3 < T6 . T] i < T9 . T9 = T2
,
TlO = 19, X2 < T9, Tl4 < Tl3, Tl = Tl3, 13 < Tl3, to < X2
}
Gamma = pi: Ti 2 proc(iovar, iivar)
A partial trace of the analysis of this program is shown in Chapter VI.
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// + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + * + + * + + + + + •*- + + -*- + + -*•*-•*•* + + + + *- + •*• + + + + + + * + *•*•*
// File: test. Java
// Date: 24 Feb 98
//
// Author: LT James D. Harvey, USN
//
// Purpose: Developed as part of a secure information
// flow static analyzer.
//** + + + + + *** + * + + ******** + + + + *** + + + ** + + * + + + + * + ** + + **•* + + *•* + *
class test
{
public static void pl(int x, int y)
{
int a = x;
int b = 0;
while (a > 0)
{
b = b + 1;





public static void p2(int a, int b)
{
a = a + 4 ;
b = b + 2;




pi ( a , b ) ;
}
b = a + b;
}
public static void main (
)
{
int s - 1;
int t = 8;
do{
p2(2,t) ;
t = t - 1;
} while (t > 3)
;
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The output of the static analyzer on the above program produced the following results:
1 The First procedure, p 1
,
produces:
Constraint set: {xh = I12, T12 < 14, i6 = 14, 15 = T4, 12 < 14, 19 = i6,
18 5: 16, 16 — t3 5 17 = 16, 13 5: 16, Xl 1 S 19, 19 = T2,
XlO = X9, 1 2 < X9 , X14 < X13, T13 = Ii, I3 < T13, To < 1:1
Gamma: pi: xnproc dovar, iivar)
2. The second procedure, p2, produces:
Constraint set: { X30 = X17, I29 = in, X20 = in, X19 < in, in = X15,
Xl8 = X17, X15 < X17, T22 < X20, X20 = Xi6, X21 = X20,
Xl6 — X20, X27 = X25, X27 = X23, X29 5: X23, T25 = X23,
X24 — X23, X15 < X23, Xi6 < X24, X26 — Xo, X25 = Xo,
Xl6 < X25, X15 < 126, X28 = Xo, X27 = Xo, X15 < X27, X16 < 128,
X32 < X30, X30 = Xi6, X31 = X30, X15 < X30, Xi6 < X31 }
Gamma: p2 : inproc (Xi.war, x^var)
,
pi : Xnproc (Xovar, iivar)
3. The third procedure, main, produces:
Constraint set: {142 < x4o, X35 = X40, x4 i = x4o, X34 < x4o,
X37 = X35, I36 - Xl5, X35 = X15, X34 < X36,
X39 — X37, T37 = T34, I38 = X37, T34 < T37 }
Gamma: main : i42proc ( )
,
p2 : xn proc ( a : iisvar, b : x ]6var),
pi : xnproc (x:x var, y:T]Var)
4. Gamma is updated with each procedure.
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